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THE RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL IN OBSCENITY
PROSECUTIONS: A SIXTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
FOR A FIRST AMENDMENT PROBLEM
INTRODUCTION
In prosecutions pursuant to municipal ordinances prohibiting dis-
tribution or display of obscene material,. a question arises as to
whether the defendant has a constitutional right to a trial by jury . 2
Some states provide for a jury trial for all or most municipal offenses; 3
1. E.g., Arcadia, Cal., Ordinance 1690 (Nov. 20, 1979) (amending Arcadia,
Cal., Mun. Code § 6439); Vernon, Conn., Ordinance 89 (Jan. 1, 1975); Hollywood,
Fla., Ordinance 0-77-72 (Oct. 19, 1977); Hollywood, Fla., Ordinance 0-77-71 (Oct.
5, 1977); Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code § 192-10.1 (adopted June 24, 1960); Hoffman
Estates, Ill., Ordinance 699-1975 (Mar. 6, 1975) (amending Hoffman, Ill., Mun.
Code ch. 7); Bowling Green, Ky., Ordinance 77-34 (June 21, 1977) (amending
Bowling Green, Ky., Code of Ords. by adding §§ 9-100 to -110); Philadelphia, Pa.,
Bill No. 699 (Oct. 7, 1977) (amending Philadelphia, Pa., Code tit. 10 by adding
ch.10-1100); Irving, Tex., Ordinance 2923 (Jan. 6, 1977) (amending Irving, Tex.,
Code of Civ. & Crim. Ords. by adding § 44); Fairfax County, Va., Code § 5-1-23
(adopted Feb. 9, 1976); Weston, Wis., Mun. Code § 4.105 (adopted May 5, 1978).
Whether municipalities can prohibit the distribution or display of obscene .material
may depend on whether a state statute preempts the ordinance. Whitney v. Munici-
pal Court, 58 Cal. 2d 907, 909, 377 P.2d 80, 81-82, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16, 17-18 (1962)
(en bane); see Bundo v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 92 Mich. App. 20, 25, 283 N.W.2d
860, 863 (1979). In addition to considering the express language of the statute,
Whitney v. Municipal Court, 58 Cal. 2d 907, 909, 377 P.2d 80, 82, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16,
18 (1962) (en bane); Bundo v. Liquor Control Comm'n, 92 Mich. App. 20, 25-26,
283 N.W.2d 860, 863 (1979), courts will also consider legislative history in determin-
ing whether municipal legislation is preempted. Whitney v. Municipal Court, 58
Cal. 2d 907, 909, 377 P.2d 80, 82, 27 Cal. Rptr. 16, 18 (1962) (en bane); Olson v.
City of West Fargo, 305 N.W.2d 821, 831 (N.D. 1981).
2. Compare Holderfield v. City of Birmingham, 380 So. 2d 990, 993 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1979) (jury trial not constitutionally required in the first instance), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980), with City of Kansas City v. Darby, 544 S.W.2d 529,
532 (Mo. 1976) (en bane) (jury trial constitutionally required in the first instance),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977). One of the purposes of the
sixth amendment is to protect defendants from the "'corrupt or overzealous prosecu-
tor and ... the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 156 (1968). Juries also provide for (1) "resolution of factual issues by group
deliberation rather than by the decision of a single judge," Note, The Petty Offense
Exception and the Right to a Jury Trial, 48 Fordham L. Rev. 205, 210 (1979)
[hereinafter cited as Petty Offense]; see Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51, 99-106
(1895), and (2) community involvement in the judicial process so as to create both
community responsibility and public confidence in the system. Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 187 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting); Petty Offense, supra, at 210-11.
3. Mont. Code Ann. § 95.2004(a) (Supp. 1977); N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §
340.40(2) (McKinney 1971). Minnesota case law requires a jury trial for all obscenity
prosecutions. City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979)(en bane).
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in other states, however, municipal offenses are not tried to juries. 4 A
few states use a two-tier system in which the initial trial is by the
court,5 but on appeal the defendant is entitled to a jury trial de novo.0
Although the Supreme Court has determined that a two-tier system
does not by itself unconstitutionally burden a defendant's right to a
jury trial, 7 it has declined to hear the question of whether this system
is constitutional in the context of an obscenity prosecution. 8
The sixth amendment 9 guarantees a defendant a trial by jury for
non-petty, or serious, offenses'°-a characterization that customarily
4. State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826, 828 (Fla. 1976); Boyd v. County of Dade, 123
So. 2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1960); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.251; see N.J. Ct. R. 7:4. New Jersey
municipal courts have jurisdiction of "all complaints charging offenses within its trial
jurisdiction and all indictable offenses triable by it upon the defendant's waiver of
indictment and trial by jury." Id. 7:4-1. All crimes in New Jersey are prosecuted by
indictment unless indictment is waived by the defendant. Id. 3:7-2. Crimes in New
Jersey are defined as offenses that carry authorized sentences in excess of six months.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:1-4(a) (West 1980). Thus, prosecutions for violations of munici-
pal ordinances are not tried to a jury if the authorized sentence is six months or less.
5. Alabama does not provide a jury trial in municipal courts. Ala. Code § 12-
14-6 (1975). In Pennsylvania, a defendant charged with a violation of a municipal
ordinance that punishes a crime as a summary offense is not entitled to a jury trial
initially. Pa. R. Crim. P. 63(b). In Virginia, the accused has the right to a jury trial
in a court of record on a plea of not guilty, Va. Sup. Ct. R. 3A:19(a), but municipal
courts are not courts of record. Va. Code § 16.1-69.5(a), (e) (1975). Municipal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction of prosecutions for violations of municipal ordinances
within the geographic boundaries of the municipality. Id. § 16.1-124(1). Washington
provides a jury trial in its municipal courts when the defendant could lose his driver's
license if convicted or for prosecutions of "other gross misdemeanors." Wash. Rev.
Code Ann. § 3.50.280 (Supp. 1981). Gross misdemeanors are offenses punishable by
sentences of more than ninety days but not more than one year. Id. § 9A.04.040(2)
(1977).
6. Alabama allows appeals from municipal court convictions, Ala, Code § 12-
14-70(c) (Supp. 1979), providing for a jury trial de novo, id. § 12-11-30(3) (1975), in
misdemeanor cases, id. § 15-14-30, which are punishable by a fine of up to $500 and
a sentence of up to six months. Id. § 15-18-3. Pennsylvania provides a jury trial de
novo in the Philadelphia court system. Pa. R. Crim. P. 6006'(a)(1), (2). Virginia
grants a right of appeal from a court not of record, Va. Code § 16.1-132 (1975), and
provides for a jury trial de novo. Id. § 16.1-136. The judgments of the municipal
courts in Washington are subject to review in the superior court de novo with a jury.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. §§ 3.50.370, .410 (Supp. 1980).
7. Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 630 (1976).
8. Howell v. City of Birmingham, 383 So. 2d 567 (Ala. Crim. App.), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 937 (1980). The Court was presented with the question "[w]hether,
in obscenity cases, a trial by jury is required in the first instance on the issue of
contemporary community standards." Petition for Certiorari at i, Howell v. City of
Birmingham, 449 U.S. 937 (1980). Three justices dissented, voting to grant certiorarf
and reverse the conviction. 449 U.S. at 937.
9. U.S. Const. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury .... "). The right to trial
by jury in federal court guaranteed by the sixth amendment is applicable to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
10. See Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 371 (1979); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S.
145, 159 (1968); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 630 (1937); Callan
v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888) (dictum).
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requires an authorized sentence in excess of six months." Many
municipal obscenity ordinances authorize only fines or sentences too
short to qualify obscenity as non-petty on the basis of length of sen-
tence alone.12 Thus, under the interpretation of the sixth amendment
that focuses on length of sentence, a jury trial is not guaranteed in all
obscenity cases.
11. Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 512 (1974); Baldwin v. New York,
399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970). The seriousness of the penalty is an element to be considered
"in determining whether a statutory offense, in other respects trivial and not a crime
at common law, must be deemed so serious as to be comparable with common law
crimes, and thus to entitle the accused to the benefit of a jury trial." District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937). As early" as Schick v. United States,
195 U.S. 65 (1904), the Supreme Court suggested that the authorized penalty was a
factor in the petty/non-petty determination. Id. at 67-68. The Court has emphasized
that the maximum authorized sanction is the most relevant indication of a crime's
seriousness. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970); Frank v. United States,
395 U.S. 147, 148 (1969).
12. E.g., Arcadia, Cal., Ordinance 1690, § 2 (Nov. 20, 1979) (amending Arca-
dia, Cal., Mun. Code § 6439) (six months and $500 fine): Vernon, Conn., Ordinance
89, § 3 (Jan. 1, 1975) (thirty days and $100 fine): Hollywood, Fla., Ordinance 0-77-
72, § 1 (Oct. 19, 1975) (ninety days and $500 fine); Chicago, Ill., Mun. Code § 192-
10.2 (adopted Dec. 28, 1956) (six months and $200 fine); Hoffman Estates, Ill.,
Ordinance 699-1975, § 1 (March 6, 1975) (amending Hoffman Estates, Ill., Mun.
Code by adding ch. 7, art. 11) ($500 fine); Bowling Green, Ky., Ordinance 77-34(4)
(June 21, 1977) (amending Bowling Green, Ky., Code of Ords. by adding § 9-110)
(six months and $500 fine); Philadelphia, Pa., Bill No. 699 (Oct. 7, 1977) (amending
Philadelphia, Pa., Code tit. 10 by adding ch. 10-1100) (ninety days and $300 fine);
Irving, Tex., Ordinance 2923, § 2 (Jan. 6, 1977) ($200 fine); Veston, Wis., Mun.
Code § 4.105(4) (adopted May 8, 1978) (sixty days and $1500 fine). Contra Fairfax
County, Va., Code § 5-1-23(g)(1) (adopted Feb. 9, 1976) (twelve months and $1000
fine). Many state statutes, on the other hand, authorize sentences longer than six
months for the display, distribution or other promotion of obscene material. Cal.
Penal Code § 311.2 (West Supp. 1982) (prohibiting preparation or importation of
obscene material); id. § 311.9 (most violations of § 311.2 punishable by sentences up
to one year); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 775.082(4)(a) (West 1976) (misdemeanor of first
degree, possible one-year imprisonment); id. § 847.011(1)(a) (misdemeanor of first
degree); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 11-20(d) (Smith-Hurd 1979) (Class A misdemeanor);
id. § 1005-8-3(a)(1) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981-1982) (Class A misdemeanor, possible
sentence less than one year); Ky. Rev. Stat. § 531.020(2) (1975) (distribution of more
than one unit of material a Class A misdemeanor); id. § 532.090 (Class A misde-
meanor, sentence up to one year); N.Y. Penal Law § 70.15(1) (McKinney 1980) (class
A misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment of up to one year); id. § 235.05 (class A
misdemeanor); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.34 (Vernon 1974) (felony of third degree
punishable by not more than ten years, not less than two years); id. § 43.23(b)
(Vernon Supp. 1982) (felony of third degree); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 939.50(3)(d) (\Vest
Supp. 1981-1982) ($10,000 or five years imprisonment or both for a class D felony);
id. § 944.21 (class D felony); see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:34-2(b) (West Supp. 1980)
("any person charged pursuant to this section shall have the right to a trial by jury").
A state obscenity statute may preempt municipal prohibition of obscenity. See s-upra
note 1.
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Length of sentence, however, is not the only factor relevant to a
classification of an offense as non-petty; courts have also considered
whether the crime is morally offensive. Whether obscenity is suffi-
ciently offensive to qualify as a non-petty crime, however, has not
been considered. Instead, obscenity defendants have been granted or
denied jury trials under a first amendment analysis alone.13
Freedom of speech is "the matrix, the indispensable condition, of
nearly every other form of freedom."' 4 Obscenity is not part of that
matrix.' 5 Because there is nevertheless a fine line between protected
and unprotected speech,' 6 and because the erroneous removal of that
protection hinders the free exchange of ideas,' 7 the Supreme Court
requires procedural safeguards of the highest order in cases involving
first amendment rights.' Courts in obscenity cases are not in agree-
ment, however, as to whether the Constitution guarantees an obscen-
ity defendant the right to a jury trial, 9 or if a jury is guaranteed,
whether it should be accorded in the first instance in two-tier
13. Holderfield v. City of Birmingham, 380 So. 2(1 990, 991-93 (Ala. Crim. App.
1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283 N.W.2d 533,
537 (Minn. 1979)(en bane); City of Kansas City v. Darby, 544 S.W.2d 529, 531-32
(Mo. 1976) (en bane), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977).
14. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937), overruled on other grounds,
Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969); accord Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 520-21 (1958); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713 (1931); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda, J.
Young, Handbook on Constitutional Law 719 (1978) [hereinafter cited as J. Nowak]:
B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law: A Textbook § 8.1, at 311 (2d ed. 1979); see
Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877
(1963). "Maintenance of a system of free expression is necessary (1) as assuring
individual self-fulfillment, (2) as a means of attaining the truth, (3) as a method of
securing participation by the members of the society in social, including political,
decision-making, and (4) as maintaining the balance between stability and change in
the society." Id. at 878-79.
15. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973); Kois v. Wisconsin, 408 U.S. 229,
230 (1972) (per curiam); United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 354 (1971); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); City of Kansas City v. Darby, 544 S.W.2d
529, 532 (Mo. 1976) (en bane), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935
(1977).
16. Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 417 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,
372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961); Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525 (1958); see Hamburg, Utah Law Voided by Federal
Court, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 11, 1982, at 1, col. 1, at 2, col. 3.
17. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1958).
18. Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 315-17 & n.12 (1980) (per
curiam); McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 673-74 (1976); Blount v. Rizzi, 400
U.S. 410, 416-17 (1971); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963);
Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 731 (1961); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 525 (1958); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 488 (1957); accord Hanby v.
State, 479 P.2d 486, 490-91 (Alaska 1970); see Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51,
58 (1965); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 155 (1959).
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states.20 This Note contends that obscenity offenses are non-petty per
se and thus under the sixth amendment must be tried to a jury
regardless of the penalty authorized. This Note further contends that
because prosecuting obscenity in the two-tier system abridges first
amendment rights, a jury must be available in the first instance.
I. THE FIRST AMENDMENT APPROACH
A. Municipal Ordinance Enforcement
Whether a violation of a municipal ordinance authorizing a sen-
tence of six months or less will be tried to a jury may be dictated by
the state legislature. For example, New York State provides for a jury
trial in local criminal courts outside New York City for misdemean-
ors 2 1-all offenses punishable by sentences of more than fifteen days
but not more than one year.22 New York City criminal courts provide
a jury only when the defendant faces a possible sentence in excess of
six months.2 3 Montana provides for a jury trial in all prosecutions of
municipal offenses.2
In contrast, some states' municipal criminal justice systems do not
provide for a jury. Florida's rules of criminal procedure require a jury
trial for all criminal prosecutions.25 The Florida Supreme Court,
however, held that prosecutions of municipal offenses do not warrant
jury trials because such violations were tried without jurors prior to
the adoption of Florida's constitution.26  Obtaining the same result
more directly, New Jersey court rules do not provide for trial by jury
in municipal courts.27
19. Compare Holderfield v. City of Birmingham, 380 So. 2d 990, 993 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1979) (jury not constitutionally required), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888
(1980), and City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979) (en bane)
(same), with City of Kansas City v. Darby, 544 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. 1976) (en
banc) (jury constitutionally required), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431 U.S.
935 (1977).
20. Compare Holderfield v. City of Birmingham, 380 So. 2d 990, 991, 993 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1979) (jury not constitutionally required in the first instance), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980), with City of Kansas City v. Darby, 544 S.W.2d 529,
532 (Mo. 1976) (en banc) (jury constitutionally required in the first instance), appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977).
21. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 340.40(2) (McKinney 1971).
22. N.Y. Penal Law § 70.15(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982). Offenses punish-
able by sentences of fifteen days or less are classified as violations. Id. § 70.15(4)
(McKinney 1975).
23. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 340.40(2) (McKinney 1971).
24. Mont. Code Ann. § 95-2004(a) (Supp. 1977). In Minnesota, a jury trial is
judicially required in all obscenity prosecutions. City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283
N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979).
25. Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.251.
26. State v. Webb, 335 So. 2d 826, 828-29 (Fla. 1976); Boyd v. County of Dade,
123 So. 2d 323, 328 (Fla. 1960). A defendant would be entitled to a jury trial if the
municipal offense also constituted a crime under state law. Powers v. State, 370 So.
2d 854, 855 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); see supra note 1.
27. See supra note 4.
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Other states, however, balance the benefits of a jury trial against
administrative convenience. 28  These states provide for a jury trial
only on appeal, after the defendant has been convicted of a municipal
offense at a bench trial.29  The constitutionality of such a two-tier
system was challenged in Ludwig v. Massachusetts.3 0  Ludwig was
charged with negligently operating a motor vehicle, and under Massa-
chusett's two-tier system, 31 was tried first by the court. He challenged
the two-tier system as unconstitutionally burdening his sixth amend-
ment right to a speedy jury trial.32 The Supreme Court recognized
that the burdens inherent in the two-tier system include "(1) .. .the
financial cost of an additional trial; (2) . . .a potentially harsher
sentence if [the defendant] seeks a trial de novo in the second tier; and
(3) ...the increased psychological and physical hardships of two
trials.''33  In a five-four decision, the Court held that these burdens
did not unconstitutionally deprive the defendant of his right to a jury
trial.3 4 The Court reasoned that the increased financial, psychologi-
cal and physical hardships of two trials were alleviated by the defend-
ant's option under the Massachusetts system to waive a full trial in the
first instance.3 5 In addition, the Court found that because an imposi-
tion of a harsher sentence on appeal is only unconstitutional when
28. Municipalities will probably be unsuccessful in arguing that administrative
convenience is a sufficient reason to deny jury trials in municipal courts. The Su-
preme Court dismissed that argument in Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 73-74 &
n.22 (1970).
29. See supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
30. 427 U.S. 618 (1976).
31. Massachusetts now affords a jury trial at the first level in prosecutions of
municipal offenses. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 218, §§ 26, 26A (Michie/Law. Co-op.
Supp. 1981).
32. 427 U.S. at 623.
33. Id. at 626.
34. Id. at 630.
35. Id. at 626-30. The financial cost of an additional trial was not considered
overly burdensome because the defendant was not required to submit to a full trial In
the first tier. Id. at 626. He could admit sufficient findings of fact and permit the
court to hear enough evidence to find probable cause to believe the defendant's guilt
and enter judgment accordingly. Id. at 621, 626. If the defendant had elected to
allow the court to proceed in this manner, he still would have had the right to a jury
trial de novo. Id. at 626. The dissent strongly criticized the majority's reasoning: "[I]f
we presume that the defendant is innocent until proved guilty, we must also assume
that the innocent defendant would deny or contradict the evidence offered by the
prosecutor. The choice between admitting the truth and also the prima facie suffi-
ciency of evidence the defendant considers false or misleading, on the one hand, or
insisting on a full nonjury trial on the other, is not an insignificant price to pay for the
exercise of a constitutional right." Id. at 636. (Stevens, J., dissenting). The Court also
examined the possibility of increased psychological and physical hardships of two
trials. Id. at 628-29. There was no indication in the record as to whether the two-tier
system delayed final adjudication. Id. at 629. The Court, therefore, refused to label
these hardships as unconstitutionally burdening a defendant's right to a speedy jury
trial. Id.
1316 [Vol. 50
JURY TRIALS IN OBSCENITY CASES
vindictive,36 the mere possibility of a harsher sanction at the second
trial did not make the two-tier system unconstitutional per se. 37
The Ludwig Court's hardship analysis, however, must be limited to
the facts and circumstances of that case. 38 Other states may not allow
a defendant to avoid a full bench trial. In addition, the Ludwig
decision implicated only the sixth amendment. 39  Because the defen-
dant was charged with negligently operating a motor vehicle,40 no
first amendment issue was present. Had Ludwig been an obscenity
case, the inherent danger of suppressing speech between the two trials
would have existed,41  and the Supreme Court would have been
sensitive to whether the procedural protections afforded were of the
highest order.42
B. The Role of the First Amendment in Obscenity Prosecutions
Under the obscenity test articulated by the Supreme Court in Miller
v. California,43 material cannot be deemed obscene unless the average
person, applying contemporary community standards, would find it
patently offensive and appealing to prurient interests. 44  The Court
36. Id. at 627 (citing Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 116 (1972); North
Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 725 (1969)).
37. 427 U.S. at 627.
38. The Missouri Supreme Court held that Ludwig was not controlling in an
obscenity case. City of Kansas City v. Darby, 544 S.W.2d 529, 531 (Mo. 1976) (en
banc), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977).
39. 427 U.S. at 623, 628-29.
40. Id. at 622-23.
41. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
42. See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
43. 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973) ("(a) whether 'the average person, applying contem-
porary community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to
the prurient interest ... ; (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently
offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and
(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value" (citations omitted)). A jury is best equipped to determine contempo-
rary community standards. Id. at 26. Because the value of a work, taken as a whole,
is not determined in light of contemporary community standards, Smith v. United
States, 431 U.S. 291, 301 (1977); see F. Schauer, The Law of Obscenity 123-24
(1976), this Note does not discuss the third component of the Miller test.
44. See Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 299-301, 308 (1977) (interpreting
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), as requiring that appeal to prurient inter-
ests, as well as patent offensiveness, be measured in light of contemporary commu-
nity standards); Note, "Contemporary Community Standards" in Obscenity Prosecu-
tions-Smith v. United States, 30 Baylor L. Rev. 317, 320-22 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Contemporary Community Standards]. When a jury is present it determines
if material is obscene. E.g., Bohin v. State, 156 Ga. App. 206, 208, 274 S.E.2d 592,
594 (1980), cert. denied, No. 37006 (Jan. 16, 1981); State v. Luck, 353 So. 2d 225,
229 (La. 1977); Carlock v. State, 609 S.W.2d 787, 788 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Berg
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commented that only hard-core pornography would be labeled ob-
scene under this test.45  Although the classification of material as
hard-core pornography would not seem to be a sensitive determina-
tion, obscenity regulations must embody stringent procedural safe-
guards as a "special instance of the larger principle that the freedoms
of expression must be ringed about with adequate bulwarks."4 0 Con-
sistent with this policy, Miller called for continued reliance "on the
jury system, accompanied by the safeguards that judges, rules of
evidence, presumption of innocence, and other protective features
provide." 47
The Miller Court's call for reliance on the jury has been variously
interpreted by the states. In City of Kansas City v. Darby,48 the
Missouri Supreme Court held that the two-tier system as applied to
obscenity prosecutions is unconstitutional. 49  The court interpreted
Miller as requiring a jury because jurors are best suited to determine
contemporary community standards, 0 and thus held that if a jury is
delayed until a later proceeding, the defendant's first amendment
rights would be unlawfully restricted.5 1 Although the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals, in Holderfield v. City of Birmingham,52
agreed that jurors are uniquely qualified to make obscenity determi-
nations, it refused to hold that a jury trial was constitutionally man-
dated.5 3 Because provision for a jury trial was thus discretionary with
v. State, 599 S.W.2d 802, 804-05, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); see City of Duluth v.
Sarette, 283 N.W.2d 533, 537-38 (Minn. 1979) (en bane); City of Kansas City v.
Darby, 544 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. 1976) (en bane), appeal dismissed and cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977); McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 347-48 (Mo. 1975)
(en bane). By making patent offensiveness and appeal to prurient interests questions
of fact, the Court has appeared to shift to the juries much of the responsibility for
determining what is obscene. Note, Jenkins v. Georgia, and Hamling v. United
States: Testing the Miller Obscenity Test, 7 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 349, 353
(1975) [hereinafter cited as Testing the Miller Test].
45. 413 U.S. at 27.
46. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 66 (1963); see supra note 18 and
accompanying text. The chilling effect, Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 162-63
(1974) (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S.
49, 100-01 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting)); F. Schauer, supra note 43, at 199-200;
Testing the Miller Test, supra note 44, at 360-61, may be the reason for the Court's
requiring stringent protections in obscenity proceedings. See Smith v. California, 361
U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959) ("[there exist] legal devices and doctrines, in most applica-
tions consistent with the Constitution, which cannot be applied in settings where
they have the collateral effect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the
individual the more reluctant to exercise it.").
47. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).
48. 544 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1976) (en bane), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431
U.S. 935 (1977).
49. Id. at 532.
50. Id. at 530 (citing McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343 (Mo. 1975) (en bane)).
51. Id. at 532.
52. 380 So. 2d 990 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980).
53. Id. at 993.
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the state, a jury was not required in the first instance.5 The Minne-
sota Supreme Court's constitutional analysis in City of Duluth v.
Sarette5 5 led to the same conclusion, but the court nevertheless re-
quired a jury trial for all obscenity prosecutions because "a jury can
best reflect contemporary community standards. '"s
Supreme Court decisions subsequent to Miller implicitly assumed
that a jury would be present to determine whether material is ob-
scene. For example, the Court has held that expert testimony on the
nature of the material is not constitutionally required: 7 Jurors do not
need expert assistance because "[s]uch testimony is usually admitted
for the purpose of explaining to lay jurors what they otherwise could
not understand."'ss In addition, jurors cannot be bound by a legisla-
tive attempt to define obscenity. The Supreme Court has determined
that a codification of community standards is merely informative and
cannot supplant the jury's role of defining obscenity.59 Furthermore,
once the standards are defined, the jury must decide, in its traditional
role as fact finder, whether the material appeals to prurient interests
and is patently offensive to the average member of the community. 6°
The Supreme Court's emphasis on the jury system in obscenity cases
may be attributable to a belief that " '[t]he jury represents a cross-
section of the community and has a special aptitude for reflecting the
view of the average person.' ,,61 A judge, however, does not consti-
tute a cross-section of the community, and his views are inherently
more one-sided than a jury's. Thus, as the finder of fact, he "is placed
in the unenviable position of determining contemporary community
standards... from his contacts with [the community]," 02 necessarily
fewer than those of a jury.
54. Id. at 991, 993.
55. 283 N.W.2d 533 (Minn. 1979)(en bane). Minnesota provides for a jury trial
only if there is a possibility of incarceration. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 487.25(6) (West
Supp. 1982). The municipal ordinance in Sarette authorized a fine as the only
possible sanction. 283 N.W.2d at 535.
56. 283 N.W.2d at 538.
57. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 100 (1974); Kaplan v. California, 413
U.S. 115, 121 (1973); see Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 (1973).
58. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 56 n.6 (1973).
59. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 302, 308 (1977). A state legislature may
specify the geographic boundaries of the relevant community, Jenkins v. Georgia,
418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974), but need not. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104-
05 (1974).
60. See supra note 44.
61. McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 688 (1976) (Brennan, J., concurring)
(quoting Kingsley Books, Inc. v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436, 448 (1957) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting)); accord Holderfield v. City of Birmingham, 380 So. 2d 990, 993 (Ala.
Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 888 (1980); City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283
N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979) (en bane); MeNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 347-
48 (Mo. 1975) (en bane); see City of Kansas City v. Darby, 544 S.W.2d 529, 530
(Mo. 1976) (en bane), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977).
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Given the inherent deficiency of a judge's view of contemporary
community standards, it is appropriate policy to provide for a jury
trial in all obscenity prosecutions. In City of Kansas City v. Darby,63
however, the Missouri Supreme Court did not rely on policy. In
holding that the first amendment requires a jury trial in prosecutions
for violations of municipal obscenity ordinances, 4 the court relied on
a prior Missouri decision that required a jury determination in a civil
proceeding to enjoin the distribution of obscene material.0 5 Although
the result in Darby seems correct based on policy considerations, that
court's determination that a jury was constitutionally required is
somewhat flawed.
In Alexander v. Virginia," the Supreme Court held that a jury trial
is not constitutionally required in a state civil obscenity proceeding. 07
The Court based its decision on the fact that the seventh amendment
right to a jury trial was not applicable to the states. 8 The first
amendment right of free speech, however, is applicable to the
states.69 Accordingly, if a jury trial for an obscenity prosecution were
required by the first amendment alone, the Court in Alexander would
arguably have been obliged to reach a different conclusion. First
amendment protections, 70 however, often need to be implemented
through other constitutional provisions. 71  The first amendment's
guarantee of free speech can only be accorded a jury trial through the
sixth amendment. Although the first amendment, therefore, does not
62. City of Duluth v. Sarette, 283 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Minn. 1979) (en bane).
63. 544 S.W.2d 529 (Mo. 1976) (en bane), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431
U.S. 935 (1977).
64. Id. at 532.
65. Id. at 530 (citing McNary v. Carlton, 527 S.W.2d 343, 344, 347-48 (Mo.
1975) (en bane)).
66. 413 U.S. 836 (1973) (per curiam).
67. Id. at 836.
68. Id. (citing Melancon v. McKeithen, 345 F. Supp. 1025, 1027, 1035-45, 1048
(E.D. La.) (non-applicability of seventh amendment to the states), aff'd sub norn.
Mayes v. Ellis, 409 U.S. 943 (1972)). It is settled law that the seventh amendment
does not apply to the states. E.g., O'Connor v. State, 507 F. Supp. 546, 548 (D. Nev.
1981); Iacaponi v. New Amsterdam Casualty Co., 258 F. Supp. 880, 884 (W.D. Pa.
1966), aff'd per curiam, 379 F.2d 311 (3rd Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054
(1968); United States ex rel. Morgan v. Wolfe, 232 F. Supp. 85, 97 (S.D.N.Y. 1964);
J. Nowak, supra note 14, at 415.
69. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 707 (1931); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S.
652, 666 (1925); L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 11-2, at 567 (1978).
70. U.S. Const. amend. I. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establish-
ment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances." Id.
71. See Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 102 S. Ct. 752, 764 (1982). Although a claimant may have a
first amendment constitutional right, he cannot litigate a violation of that right solely
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by itself require a jury trial, it recommends as a matter of policy that
one be provided. The two-tier system, attempting to balance adminis-
trative convenience and a defendant's jury trial right, allows a judge
to restrict the free exchange of ideas between a defendant's trial and
appeal. 72 Furthermore, a defendant faced with the burdens attend-
ing a second trial73 may, as a practical matter, not wish to avail
himself of the jury trial, accepting the lower court's sanction. A two-
tier system thus prevents the full implementation of the policy that a
jury trial be provided in first amendment cases.74 The larger question
still remains, however, whether the Constitution guarantees a jury
trial in obscenity prosecutions at all.
II. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT APPROACH
A. The Non-Petty Standard
The sixth amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecu-
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by
an impartial jury."'7 5  A literal reading of the amendment would
obviate the determination of whether a crime is petty or non-petty,
but the Supreme Court, in Duncan v. Louisiana,7(3 held that the right
to a jury trial only attaches to non-petty offenses."1 Because the
offense in Duncan was obviously non-petty, 78 however, the Court did
not determine where the fine line between petty and non-petty of-
fenses must be drawn, 7 and expressed an awareness of the difficult
question that a closer case would present.80
because it has been encroached. Id. at 765. To have standing, he must either isolate a
personal injury, id., or rely on an injury to others. Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981). Even if article III standing is established, first amendment
rights cannot be enforced against state action unless the balancing test of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment is satisfied. See id. at 71.
72. City of Kansas City v. Darby, 544 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. 1976) (en banc),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977).
73. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
74. City of Kansas City v. Darby, 544 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Mo. 1976) (en banc),
appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 431 U.S. 935 (1977). Contra Holderfield v. City of
Birmingham, 380 So. 2d 990, 991, 993 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 888 (1980).
75. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
76. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
77. Id. at 159-60. This has traditionally been the rule. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S.
367, 371 (1979); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68-69 (1970); District of
Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628-30 (1937); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540,
555 (1888).
78. 391 U.S. at 162 (two-year sentence authorized).
79. Id. at 161.
80. See id. at 160. "Of course the boundaries of the petty offense category have
always been ill-defined, if not ambulatory. In the absence of an explicit constitu-
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In Baldwin v. New York,"' the Court refined the petty/non-petty
distinction. Baldwin challenged the constitutionality of New York's
denial of a jury trial in crimes involving a maximum sentence not in
excess of one year.82 The Court noted that every other jurisdiction in
the country provided for a jury when the possible sentence exceeded
six months.8 3 Finding this unanimity persuasive, the Court held that
crimes carrying possible sentences in excess of six months are certainly
serious. 4
The Baldwin Court refused to hold, however, that all offenses
carrying possible sentences of six months or less are necessarily
petty. 5 Indeed, before classifying a crime as petty, a court must look
"to both the nature of the offense itself. . . as well as the maximum
potential sentence . . . in determining whether a particular offense
[is] so serious as to require a jury trial."' s6 Baldwin is thus consistent
with the statement in Duncan v. Louisiana8 7 that "[c]rimes carrying
possible penalties up to six months do not require a jury trial if they
otherwise qualify as petty offenses."88 Both Duncan and Baldwin,
therefore, recognized that a crime may be non-petty by its nature,
regardless of the authorized sanction.8 9 Thus, if the possible term of
imprisonment is not in excess of six months, it is necessary to examine
the nature of the offense before classifying it as petty. 0°
tional provision, the definitional task necessarily falls on the courts, which must
either pass upon the validity of legislative attempts to identify those petty offenses
which are exempt from jury trial or, where the legislature has not addressed itself to
the problem, themselves face the question in the first instance." Id. Recognizing this
obligation, the Court held that a possible sentence of two years is sufficiently serious
to classify a crime as non-petty. Id. at 161-62.
81. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
82. Id. at 67, 69.
83. Id. at 71-72. The Court also noted that "with a few exceptions, crimes triable
without a jury ... since the late 18th century were . . . generally punishable by no
more than a six-month prison term." Id. at 71 (footnote omitted). See generally
Frankfurter & Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of
Trial by Jury, 39 Harv. L. Rev. 917 (1926) (discussing the existence and use of the six-
month rule at common law).
84. 399 U.S. at 69.
85. Id. at 69 n.6. The concurring opinion, written by Justice Black, adhered to
an absolutist position, requiring a jury trial in all criminal prosecutions. Id. at 74-76
(Black and Douglas, JJ., concurring in judgment).
86. Id. at 69 n.6 (citations omitted).
87. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
88. Id. at 159 (emphasis added).
89. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68, 69 n.6 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 156, 159 (1968); accord Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 624-
25 (1976); Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974); Frank v. United States, 395
U.S. 147, 148-50 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 196-97 (1968); Cheff v.
Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 378-80 (1966).
90. Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 n.6 (1970); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 159 (1968); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 68 (1904). Traditionally,
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In what might be interpreted as a rejection of this approach, the
Court in Codispoti v. Pennsylvaniag1 stated that a fixed line existed
between petty and non-petty offenses: All crimes carrying sentences of
six months or less are petty; all carrying sentences of more than six
months are serious.92  Any extrapolation from Codispoti of a fixed line
in the petty/non-petty determination for all cases, however, would be
erroneous.9 3 The defendant in Codispoti was charged with criminal
contempt.9 4 Criminal contempt is a sui generis crime;95 its punish-
ment is not intended to deter morally offensive conduct but to protect
the dignity of the court. 96 The Court has consistently recognized that
criminal contempt is petty by its nature and can only be classified
non-petty by the penalty involved.9 7
the Supreme Court has determined whether crimes are non-petty per se by examining
them in light of at least one of the following three factors: (1) whether the crime was
indictable at common law; (2) whether the crime was malum in se; and (3) whether
the crime involved moral turpitude. Petty Offense, supra note 2, at 213; e.g., District
of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624-25 (1937) (morally inoffensive, not
indictable at common law); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1930)
(malum in se, indictable at common law); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 67-68
(1904) (not morally delinquent); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 557 (1888) (indict-
able at common law). State and federal courts regularly follow this approach. E.g.,
United States v. Craner, 652 F.2d 23, 26 (9th Cir. 1981); United States v. Sanchez-
Meza, 547 F.2d 461, 463-65 (9th Cir. 1976); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp.
1335, 1343-44 (D. Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427 F. Supp. 5, 9-10 (S.D. Ohio 1976);
Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 393-94 (Alaska 1970); Bruce v. State, 126
Ariz. 271, 273, 614 P.2d 813, 815 (1980) (en bane); People v. Oppenheimer, 42 Cal.
App. 3d Supp. 4, 11, 116 Cal. Rptr. 795, 800 (1974); State v. Wikle, 291 N.W.2d
792, 794 (S.D. 1980).
91. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
92. Id. at 512.
93. The Court improperly cited Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970),
and Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1969), for the fixed-line proposi-
tion. 418 U.S. at 512. Frank implicitly recognized that the authorized sentence is not
the only factor to be considered in the petty/non-petty determination. 395 U.S. at
148. Baldwin explicitly recognized the Court's tradition of examining the nature of
an offense as well as the maximum potential sentence before classifying it as petty or
serious. 399 U.S. at 69 n.6. Furthermore, Codispoti recognized that a majority of the
Court has never held that sentences of six months or less are necessarily petty. 418
U.S. at 512 n.4.
94. 418 U.S. at 509.
95. Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966); Myers v. United States,
264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924).
96. W. LaFave & A. Scott, Handbook on Criminal Law § 7, at 39 (1972); see
Myers v. United States, 264 U.S. 95, 103 (1924); Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194
U.S. 324, 327 (1904). The conduct that results in criminal contempt can also be
prosecuted as an additional offense. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra, § 7, at 43.
97. E.g., Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 476 (1975); Taylor v. Hayes, 418
U.S. 488, 496 (1974); see Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147, 149-50 (1969); Bloom
v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 378-80
(1966). In most crimes, the authorized sentence is the most relevant consideration.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159, 162 & n.35 (1968). Legislatures, however,
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Classifying contempt as a crime petty by its nature is consistent
with the Court's recognition that a class of crimes may exist that are
non-petty per se because they are morally offensive, regardless of how
insignificant the authorized sanction.08 In contrast to an objective
six-month standard, an evaluation of the moral offensiveness of a
crime involves the use of subjective criteria. In the late nineteenth
century, the Supreme Court looked to whether the offense was indict-
able at common law.9 9 Before the states began to adopt penal
codes,100 a crime was indictable at common law if the act was deemed
"injurious to public morals." 10' Distribution or display of obscene
material was considered such a crime. 0 2 That they were indictable
at common law, however, may be insufficient to qualify crimes as
non-petty because what was considered morally offensive at common
law might not be considered inherently evil today.103
Recognizing that society's moral standards may change, the Court
has turned to the additional criteria of whether the offense was ma-
often call for prosecutions of criminal contempt without authorizing specific senten-
ces. Id. at 162 n.35; e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 401 (1976); N.Y. Jud. Law § 750(A)(2), (3), (4)
(McKinney 1975); id. § 751(1) (McKinney Supp. 1981-1982); 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann.
§§ 4131-4132 (Purdon 1981); Va. Code § 18.2-456 (1975). When no specific sentence
is authorized, the penalty actually imposed is the criterion to be used in determining
whether a contempt is petty or non-petty. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 162
n.35 (1968); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1976) (sentence of six months authorized for
criminal contempt committed outside presence of court).
98. See supra notes 85-90 and accompanying text.
99. Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555-57 (1888); see Petty Offense, supra note
2, at 213. In later cases, whether the crime was indictable at common law continued
to be a consideration in the petty/non-petty determination. E.g., District of Colum-
bia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63,
73 (1930).
100. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 96, § 9, at 60.
101. Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (19,8); accord 1 J. Bishop, Bishop
on Criminal Law § 500 (9th ed. 1923); Clark & Marshall, A Treatise on the Law of
Crimes § 11.09 (M. Wingersky 6th ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as Clark & Marshall];
1 F. Wharton, Wharton's Criminal Law § 16, at 21 (12th ed. 1932); cf. W. LaFave
& A. Scott, supra note 96, § 6, at 29 n.25 (common-law crimes inherently evil). For a
summary of the history of obscenity crimes from common law to its early infancy as a
statutory offense, see Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 1,47, 163 n.1 (1959)(Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
102. Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 163 n.1 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 515 (1948); Commonwealth v. Sharpless,
2 Serg. & Rawle 91, 101 (Pa. 1815); 1 J. Bishop, supra note 101, § 500; Clark &
Marshall, supra note 101, § 11.10, at 692.
103. United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1342 (D. Md. 1978) ("[t]hc
Court must look to the 'principles' of the common law to determine if a particular
offense is one which would fall into the class of cases properly labeled . . .as 'so
serious' that it is 'comparable to a common law crime.' "); see District of Columbia v.
Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937) (recognizing that a crime not indictable at
common law might be considered serious today).
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lum in se or involved moral turpitude.'0 4 Offenses that are so labeled
violate the accepted mores of the community.' 05 Moreover, defen-
dants convicted of crimes malum in se, or involving moral turpitude,
may face severe collateral consequences. In fact, a conviction of a
crime involving moral turpitude may result in (1) deportation;' 0
(2) revocation of a business license; 107 (3) denial of the right to prac-
tice a profession;' 0 (4) termination of a public employee's pension
plan; 109 and (5) impeachment as a witness." 0 That such severe con-
sequences can attach regardless of the sentence indicates that the
community finds the offense morally repugnant." '
104. District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 625 (1937) (morally inoffen-
sive); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1930) (malum in se, de-
praved); Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 65, 67 (1904) (not morally delinquent);
Petty Offense, supra note 2, at 214.
105. "Malumn in se" has been used to describe crimes that are "naturally evil as
adjudged by the sense of a civilized community." State v. Horton, 139 N.C. 588, 592,
51 S.E. 945, 946 (1905). It has also been stated that a crime that requires criminal
intent as an element for conviction is malum in se. W. LaFave & A. Scott, supra note
96, § 6, at 29. Because an obscenity ordinance without a scienter requirement has
been found unconstitutional, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150, 154-55 (1959),
obscenity offenses may be malum in se. Crimes involving moral turpitude are those
that involve dishonesty, In re Pontarelli, 393 11. 310, 314-15, 66 N.E.2d 83, 85
(1946) (draft evasion); Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 Pa. Super. 212, 216, 361 A.2d
862, 865 (1976) (burglary, larceny and receiving stolen property), rev'd on other
grounds, 477 Pa. 424, 383 A.2d 1280 (1978), baseness, vileness or conduct contrary to
accepted social standards. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 226 (1951). Because
"[t]he distinction between crimes which do, and crimes which do not, involve moral
turpitude is much the same as the distinction between crimes mala in se and crimes
mala prohibita, . . . courts often define one phrase in terms of its counterpart." W.
LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 96, § 6, at 31.
106. Costello v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 376 U.S. 120, 121 (1964);
Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 225 (1951); 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(4) (1976).
107. E.g., In re Madden, 184 A.2d 204, 205 (D.C. 1962) (bail bondsman); In re
Schmidt & Sons, Inc., 79 N.J. 344, 355, 399 A.2d 637, 643 (1979) (wholesale liquor
seller).
108. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951) (dictum) (attorneys' disbar-
ment); Golde v. Fox, 98 Cal. App. 3d 167, 180-89, 159 Cal. Rptr. 864, 871-77 (1979)
(real estate license revocation); People v. Gibbons, 157 Colo. 357, 360-62, 403 P.2d
434, 435-36 (1965) (en banc) (attorneys' disbarment); Yurick v. Commonwealth, 43
Pa. Commw. 248, 249, 402 A.2d 290, 291 (1979) (revocation of license to practice
osteopathy).
109. Gauli v. Board of Trustees, 143 N.J. Super. 480, 482, 363 A.2d 911, 912
(1976).
110. Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, 227 (1951) (dictum); Tucker v. Lower,
200 Kan. 1, 5-6, 434 P.2d 320, 324 (1967); Commonwealth v. Smith, 240 Pa. Super.
212, 216, 361 A.2d 862, 865 (1976), rev'd on other grounds, 477 Pa. 424, 383 A.2d
1280 (1978); Jenkins v. State, 509 S.W.2d 240, 246 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1974); see W.
LaFave & A. Scott, supra note 96, § 6, at 31.
111. State v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1346 (D. Md. 1978); Brady v. Blair, 427
F. Supp 5, 9 (S.D. Ohio 1976); Baker v. City of Fairbanks, 471 P.2d 386, 395-96, 401
(Alaska 1970); People v. Oppenheimer, 42 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 4, 11, 116 Cal. Rptr.
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The authorized sanction, therefore, is not the only criterion to be
used in determining whether a defendant must be granted the protec-
tion of a jury. Because the length of sentence is only one indication of
the ethical judgments of a community, the subjective criteria that
indicate a crime's moral offensiveness should not be disregarded. As
the Court in Duncan noted, when the authorized sentence is six
months or less, the offense must otherwise qualify as petty for a jury
trial to be constitutionally denied.
1 2
B. Standards Applied to Obscenity
Given the social and ethical judgments of the courts, obscenity
crimes do not qualify as petty. By definition, obscenity crimes are
morally offensive. Material cannot be deemed obscene unless the
average person, applying contemporary community standards, would
find that the material is patently offensive and appeals to prurient
interests." 3 Material appeals to prurient interests when it is sala-
cious, lewd, libidinous," 4 or tends to corrupt morals by "inciting
lascivious thoughts or arousing lustful desire."'1 5 Furthermore, the
act of displaying or distributing obscene material has been denounced
as sexually immoral, appealing to base human emotions, and a "seri-
ous threat to the family, the home and the State.""16 In Miller, the
Court compared obscenity with "rape, murder and a host of other
offenses against society and its individual members.""17 Given such
description of obscenity by courts, the crime is obviously morally
offensive to
795, 800 (1974); State v. Wikle, 291 N.W.2d 792, 794 (S.D. 1980). It is interesting to
note that Washington recognizes this repugnance and provides a jury trial in the
municipal courts for offenses, the conviction of which could result in the defendant's
losing his driver's license, and for "other gross misdemeanors." Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 3.50.280 (Supp. 1981); see supra note 5.
112. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 159 (1968).
113. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
114. Walker v. Popenoe, 149 F.2d 511, 512 (D.C. Cir. 1945); United States v.
Levine, 83 F.2d 156, 156 (2d Cir. 1936); United States v. Dennett, 39 F.2d 564, 568
(2d Cir. 1930); Khan v. Leo Feist, Inc., 70 F. Supp. 450, 458 (S.D.N.Y.), ajJ'd, 165
F.2d 188 (2d Cir. 1947). The Supreme Court has never defined prurient interest, but
in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), cited these and several other earlier
cases, see infra note 115 and accompanying text, in stating that material must appeal
to prurient interests before it is deemed obscene. 354 U.S. at 489 & n.26; State v.
Great Am. Theatre Co., 227 Kan. 633, 635-36, 608 P.2d 951, 953 (1980).
115. Commonwealth v. Isenstadt, 318 Mass. 543, 550, 62 N.E.2d 840, 844 (1945);
accord State v. Becker, 364 Mo. 1079, 1084-85, 272 S.W.2d 283, 286 (1954), over-
ruled on other grounds, State v. Vollmar, 389 S.W.2d 20, 29 (Mo. 1965).
116. Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Board of Regents, 305 N.Y. 336, 342, 113
N.E.2d 502, 504 (1953), rev'd on other grounds per curiam sub nom. Superior Films,
Inc. v. Department of Educ., 346 U.S. 587 (1954); accord Paris Adult Theatre I v.
Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
117. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (footnote omitted).
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society."" Because obscenity crimes involve moral turpitude, severe
collateral consequences may redound on the convict.119 Obscenity
crimes are thus non-petty per se and require a jury trial of constitu-
tional right.
C. Procedural Protections
Obscenity convictions carry the inherent danger of suppressing the
defendant's free speech. Others not party to the prosecution suffer the
loss of their right to purchase and view material that may, in fact, be
protected by the first amendment. Because the determination of
whether material is obscene thus requires stringent procedural protec-
tions, 20 a jury should be available in the first instance. A defendant
facing a small fine or a short jail sentence may not wish to incur the
financial, physical and psychological stresses as well as the risk of a
longer sentence accompanying an additional trial. 12 If the defendant
does not appeal, a judge will make the final determination of whether
the material is obscene despite his necessarily inferior assessment of
the contemporary community standards.'- The absence of a jury
may result in the abridgement, wvithout adequate procedural protec-
tions, of the first amendment rights not only of the defendant, but also
of persons unconnected with the prosecution. Such danger requires a
jury trial in the first instance.
CONCLUSION
The denial of a jury trial in obscenity prosecutions violates the sixth
amendment. Offenses involving the display or distribution of obscene
material are non-petty regardless of the authorized sentence. Al-
though the availability of a jury on appeal would satisfy the Supreme
Court's sixth amendment concerns, it does not provide the staunch
bulwark against the suppression of free speech required by the first
amendment. A jury determination is necessary in the first instance to
give full protection to the right of free speech, not only of the defen-
dant but also of others not party to the prosecution. Economic and
administrative convenience must not be allowed to endanger these
fundamental rights.
Richard A. Weinberg
118. See, e.g., Brooklyn Graphic, Feb. 24, 1982, at 3, col. 1 (community reaction
to operation of "porno" store); id. at col. 3 ("pornographic marketeers... have a
[deleterious] effect on children and the neighborhoods in general"); Rep. Schumer,
Community Report (Feb. 1982) (legislative report to constituents concerning efforts
to close pornography store).
119. See supra notes 106-111 and accompanying text.
120. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.
121. See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
122. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
1982] 1327
